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Abstract 
This study focuses on the central-state relation on public expenditures from the view points of public preferences 
at subnational governments’ level and financing responsibilities incurred at the state and federal levels to 
accomplish the overall economic directions of the country. The study touches on how traditional views of public 
expenditures work in central-local relations and how they work in overall public revenue and expenditure 
responsibilities. It presents the revenue productivity and the degree of dependence of the regional governments 
on the central/federal government grants and what impacts this dependence would have on local revenue and 
expenditure, as well as the overall public responsibilities. Moreover, it shows how and why public sectors should 
minimize the degree of dependence on federal grants, and the relevance of revenue sources from constitutional 
point of view.  
Key words: Fiscal decentralization, federal grant, revenue from own sources, public expenditure, total revenue, 
subnational governments dependence 
 
1. Introduction  
Decisions on public expenditures
1
 and revenues are the main concern in fiscal decentralization in federal 
countries. Governments spend a large amount of resources making various decisions in performing various 
public responsibilities, and allow subnational governments to spend on public goods and services that may not 
necessarily conform with the federal government’s ultimate objectives.  
Compared to private expenditures, government spending is considerably large. It is also characterized by 
inefficiencies and lack of accountability, transparency, and responsibility in general. It most probably happens in 
many countries due to weak administrative and technical measures. Governments’ operations and responsibilities 
are very complex and their targets in a particular expenditure are diverse, and achieving all these targets complex 
administrative and managerial structures and skills. In a centralized
2
 government structure all the commands are 
located at the center and subnational governments are expected to accomplish the policy directions of the center. 
On the other hand, in a federal country the devolvement of responsibilities and accountabilities to the subnational 
governments eases the central burden of specific decisions. Furthermore, the degree of control over public 
operation in centralized and decentralized governments
3
 differ in that in a centralized system the 
accomplishment of policy can be evaluated from the viewpoint of the accomplishment of the centrally designed 
and approved policy directions. In the circumstance of decentralized structure, lower tiers are entitled to 
accomplish both the central government’s policy and their local preferences together and strike the balance 
between them, that is, subnational governments are striking the balance between their local preferences and the 
central government’s social, economic and political directions.   
                                                 
1 Public expenditures require very comprehensive administrative, political, and economic decisions. For example, 
example, subnational spending accounts for 6 percent to 50 percent in twenty-one developing countries. In ten 
developing countries the local spending ranges between 12 percent and 53 percent with an average spending of 
26 percent (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998). Thus, decisions on public spending should be thoroughly scrutinized as 
they have impact on economic resources of government.  
2
 A centralized system of governance makes the politician accountable for multiple subnational governments 
(Hindriks and Lockwood, 2004). Centralized system is most probably inconvenient to produce a diverse level of 
output across jurisdictions. It is aimed at maintaining a certain degree of uniformity across governments due to 
important informational and political constraints that would prevent the central government from achieving its 
objectives (Oates, 1999).  
3
 Findings of Hindriks and Lockwood (2004) show that decentralization matters in competency and honesty. 
They argue that decentralization dominates when politicians differ in competences, and the honesty difference of 
politicians would result in conflicting accountability effects of both subnational and central governments.  
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In this article, therefore, the interrelated questions such as “Has fiscal decentralization allowed subnational 
governments to make decisions on expenditures that would address their community’s interest? Are local 
governments raising revenues sufficiently from their revenue sources to finance their expenditures? Has public 
expenditure been harmoniously spent in local government levels to ensure public sector efficiency”? The above 
all questions are asked to answer the main question “Has fiscally decentralized structure empowered subnational 
governments in exercising their power on revenue and expenditure decisions?” This article heavily relies on the 
financial data and responses collected from regional and local governments. 
 
2. Theories of Federalism  
2.1. Theory of Fiscal Federalism  
Public finance is related to the responsibilities of a government in the economy as a whole. It deals with the roles 
of government on revenue and expenditure decisions in the economy and to take needed actions in favorable and 
unfavorable economic situations. Musgrave states the basic economic objectives of public finance as:  
1. To ensure efficiency in allocation of resources; 
2. To distribute income and wealth as desired; and  
3. To maintain sustainability in output and the level of employment (cited in Oates, 1968).  
The goal of public finance is to understand the government’s roles in the economy (Gruber, 2011, p.2). These 
above three objectives indicate the government’s responsibilities (functions) in the economy in allocating, 
distributing and stabilizing the economy using scarce resources available. Public finance is an essential 
requirement regardless of the type of government – either centralized or decentralized form.  
The centralized government structure is characterized by concentration of decision-making powers at a particular 
location holding off the states or subnational governments from decision-making (Hindriks and Lockwood, 2005 
p. 28). On the contrary, a decentralized government structure is characterized by devolution of powers and 
responsibilities of subnational governments to exercise their decision-making power in their territories. This is 
commonly known as fiscal federalism.  
In discussion of federalism, we are compelled to go back to sixty years to refer to Tiebout’s work. He basically 
states the rationality of consumers of public services in that consumers are the best judges
1
 and the consumer-
voter relation is based on rational connection between them. According to his explanation, citizens can choose 
places that better satisfy their desires, which would create competition among governments (Tiebout, 1956).  
Basely and Smart (2007, cited in Porcelli, 2009) also state the effect of election on accountability from two 
perspectives – selection effect and an incentive discipline effect. The selection effect is that the principals will 
not be voted by their people because of their inefficient services. And the incentive discipline effect is related 
with government officials’ motivation to improve their government quality aiming to increase their re-election 
probability.  
However, can the voters (citizens in a given territory) be the true judges of their government? In which type of 
community can they be true judges? Are there any other factors that make the voters either to vote for or not to 
vote for their government? The Tiebout’s “Voter-Government” relationship may work within communities who 
are aware of their government’s responsibility to the expected level and have sufficient information regarding 
their government’s accountability and performance. Moreover, they have to have sufficient information about 
their government to compare their government’s performance with other governments’ performances. It has to 
be also underscored that governments are not in power because their citizens voted for them and any under-
achievement of their promise does not necessarily penalize them. Thus, the Tiebout’s government has to be very 
benevolent and judged against its achievement by its citizens. Moreover, the vote doesn’t depend only on the 
existing achievement but also the promises and policy directions that the government has in the future. Of course, 
it is not deniable that public obligations have an impact on citizen-government relation.   
As said earlier, Tiebout’s theory argues that searching for efficient provision of public goods would solve the 
inefficiency problems of lower tiers of government. His model of mobility would be determined by the 
information available to the public regarding what responsibilities and accountabilities do local governments 
have in their jurisdictions and choices available to consumers of public services to select the best service 
providers around them.  
Porcelli (2009) states that second generation theory of fiscal federalism relates the effects of fiscal 
decentralization from the view point of political process and the possibility of information asymmetry
2
 across the 
                                                 
1
 Consumers are free to choose efficient subnational governments and their connection is determined by what the 
subnational governments are providing to satisfy their need(s). Tiebout considers voters as free to vote or refuse 
to vote based on what they actually know and understand about the performance of their government so that their 
vote is based on what they actually observe on the ground.   
2
 Rodden (2003) states that officials would abuse information asymmetry and ignore preferences of citizens and 
wrongly define public choices.  
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agents and the principals resulting in inefficiency in the government performance. 
In general, sustainable decentralization would smoothly perform when state and local governments are 
accountable for their taxpayers in raising revenue and aggregation of their expenditure needs (Zhou, 2009, p. 16). 
This would happen when the benefits from public services are tailored with the revenues that the subnational 
governments raise from tax and non-tax sources. This relation would also create accountability for inefficiencies 
in public services and policy failures at lower jurisdictions. This general concept is practically challenged in 
many ways if revenue sources are not sufficiently tailored
1
 with public operations.  
2.2. Tax Competition 
Revenue sources assigned to the subnational governments play greater role in allocation of resources and 
effectiveness of policy goals and objectives because adequate funding to the subnational governments has a 
paramount contribution for the successful decentralization (Escobar-Lemmon, 2001, p. 25).  
In a federal system, tiers of government have their own revenue sources and autonomy
2
 on tax rates and tax 
bases. This would result in tax competition at local governments’ level. Tax competition is related to tax rate 
reduction for some political and/or economic purposes. This would result in unfair competition of subnational 
governments in an economy and their fiscal needs (i.e., a yardstick competition). Do these arguments truly have 
influence on public revenue and expenditure decisions? This question actually needs a country-specific answer 
as it is very difficult to plainly accept the cases in the applications from the fact that different countries have 
different political, economic and administrative structures in even federal structures. In their empirical analyses, 
however, Hindricks and Lockwood (2005) state the existence of limited accountability when the tax rate is 
centrally set and observed by the voters in all regions. They argue that centrally set taxes are always uniform.  
In a decentralized structure, the expenditure assignment has to be attached with local taxing powers to create the 
competition and to strengthen the relationship between citizens and their closer governments (Rodden, 2002). 
The efficient allocation of resources can be seen from the view point of local governments’ proximity to their 
community as a result the decisions would be on public expenditures that the beneficiaries would prefer and 
control over resources would be strengthened and ensured as the residents are direct contributors of economic 
inputs to public goods and services. However, government’s operation cannot be seen only from provision of 
public goods and services. There are political and other related factors that would determine its operation. 
Fischel (2006) argues on Tiebout’s model that it omits politics, a supply side and a budget determination process. 
Closer governments can also be better evaluated and judged by their jurisdictions making their government 
accountable for what they have planned, actually performed, and the results they produced (either tangible or 
intangible outputs). This would hold veracity if first, voters have sufficient information about their government’s 
operations and its specific tasks for which they are accountable.  Residents’ judgment may be compromised by 
other factors such as the tax rate that their government levies on their income or wealth. On the other hand, local 
governments may conceal (or become opportunist in) their power of decisions and tend to make their higher 
government accountable for the decisions they have made themselves.   
Second, voters’ judgment can be determined by their ability to compare the resources that have been spent for 
public services with their government’s level of operation and outcomes they produced, among other things. One 
of the challenges of the residents is the information accessibility of their government and they also vote for other 
reasons such as family relation, family members, dominant clans’ leaders; or they may punish because of other 
factors such as cast groups.  
2.3. Which Government to Bear Stabilization Function 
The basic issue that can be seen from the view point of stabilization
3
 in a federal system is whether a multi-tiered 
government can achieve its economic stability objectives doing its share of responsibility as a central 
government and allowing subnational governments to take part in economic decisions. With distinguished tasks, 
the central government’s responsibilities are associated with themes of national scope and local governments 
with obligations of meeting local needs. Can the authority and assignment of responsibility make governments of 
various tiers to achieve a stabilization function (Oates, 1968)?  
                                                 
1
 In some governments, spending decisions are more decentralized than revenue sources, which would lead to 
high demand of transfer. On the other hand, revenue sources without decision-making power would also impair 
subnational discretions and doesn’t allow local officials to consider the preferences of their communities.  
2
 Autonomy enables subnational governments to decide on their affairs without the central dictates. It avoids the 
central government’s interference on local matters. In addition to decisions on expenditures, it allows local 
governments to increase their revenues from their own sources (Martinez-Vasquez and Searle, 2007). Autonomy 
thus has an impact on local decisions and resources available to be spent for their preferences.  
3
 Stabilization function is fundamentally related to the macroeconomic policy controlling the prices in an 
economy. A stabilization function is not the responsibility at subnational levels because of the fact that they use 
fiscal rather than monetary tools in an economy. Central government is thus is in the best position to accomplish the 
stabilization responsibility in an economy (Auerbach & Feldstein, 2002).   
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Due to various economic reasons, stabilization function is not at the hands of the subnational governments, 
although the aggregate amount of expenditure at the subnational levels is considerable. In USA, for example, 
public finance is the major responsibility of both central and state governments in that the central government 
takes the larger share of expenditure, which accounts for 63.5 percent of the total expenditure (21 percent of the 
GDP). The state governments also account for 36.5 percent of the total expenditure (12.10 percent of the GDP) 
of the country (Gruber, 2011). Soothing  
Stabilization function is influenced by the government spending as a whole since the local decisions on public 
spending is part of the total expenditure of the country. The normative theory of fiscal federalism states that 
stabilization function has to be the central government’s responsibility. Some of the factors influencing 
stabilization are the availability of the amount of currency in the market (money surplus), the currency printing 
and injecting it into the economy, and borrowing money from internal and external sources for public spending 
(particularly capital expenditures as a deficit financing approach suggests that governments have to invest in 
important expenditures and share the burdens among the generations in its settlement).  
The stabilization function has to be managed by the central government due to the fact that management at 
regional level would most probably be economically expensive and challenging. The severity of the challenge 
would be very considerable if the preferences are highly diverse and the economic inequalities across the local 
governments are significant. 
2.4. Fiscal Autonomy and Harmonization 
Harmonization of local autonomy is indispensable in minimizing the uncoordinated decisions of states and local 
governments. These uncoordinated decisions of taxation cause problems such as insufficient provision of public 
goods, inefficient capital allocation of states, and manipulation of capital tax rates to increase their revenues 
(Wellisch, 2004, p.59). As Poddar and Mathur (cited in Bizoili and Sacchetto, 2011) state the Indian case that 
fiscal autonomy of the central government and the states has to be harmonized in order to ensure a simplified 
compliance level and enforcement in managing the tax rates, tax bases and the administrative structure. They 
mention that any difference in interstate fiscal autonomy leads to economic distortion. However, the 
harmonization of fiscal autonomy would take the decision-making powers of states in that it would force the 
regions to stick on policies set by the center but rarely suitable for their internal administration and cause for 
conflicts and non-compliance. 
Although harmonization is needed for some tax structures such as VAT, it needs to consider the subnational 
tiers’ conditions in which the economic situations and the value of the tax bases are specified. For example, the 
difference in state of VAT or sales tax would create the economic distortions by forcing the taxpayers to move 
from the area where the high tax rate is levied to the area where the low tax rate is levied. On the contrary, minor 
difference in the taxation of immovable properties located at some regions or states would not cause economic 
distortion through shifting economic resources from the area where the tax rate is high to the area where the tax 
rate is low. Thus, the economic distortion depends on the tax bases and their characteristics.  
 As Daniel P. Rentzsch discusses the structure of government in expenditure decisions of the Swiss cantons (see 
Bizioli and Sacchetto, 2011), the system of federalism believes that if the level of government has competence to 
legislate on certain areas, it has to finance its expenditures while executing them. This argument shows that the 
level of government to which tasks are assigned should also bear the costs of executing the tasks.  
The practice of the federal council of the Swiss government shows that it prepares a financial plan, the draft 
budget and the expenditure of the confederation, and the budget is adopted (ibid). When special circumstances 
are considered, expenditures are decided by qualified quorums (for example, when debts exceed the maximum 
limit, or the new non-recurrent or recurrent expenditures are to be approved). 
 
3. Subnational Government and Their Autonomy in Ethiopia 
The aim of decentralization is to allow subnational governments to decide on the basic needs of their citizens. 
Local needs are very diverse and meeting them at the same time is impossible. It needs a consistent and strong 
commitment and financial, human, and material resources. In principle, subnational governments know their 
community’s choice better than the central government. Government’s ability to accomplish citizens’ needs is 
determined by the human and financial resources, among other things, and the power given to take action on 
public responsibilities. 
The division of subnational governments in Ethiopia is characterized by heterogeneous classification of sub-units. 
This classification has a unique feature in its economic and/or political environment. Firstly, economic and/or 
political decisions are based on the limit of their jurisdiction as a result spillover effects are not getting much 
attention in the savings of aggregate national economic resources. Secondly, resources allocated to some 
political boundaries have to be consumed either within the specific period (budget year) or even after the budget 
year (no refund whether or not the budget is partially or totally consumed in a given year), which poses 
difficulties in budget control. In other words, control over resources at a given level is weakened and the 
allocation of resources for policy priorities or local preferences can be unwisely consumed at lower levels of 
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government. If local governments have this incentive, they would not be able to accomplish their plan as 
variances of accomplishment against their plans do not have any consequence.   
The structure of subnational governments differs from region to region. In Southern Nation, Nationalities and 
People’s Regional State, for example, the zonal administrations are very active and function as an arm of the 
regional government; whereas in Afar Regional State, woredas have the direct linkage with their regional 
administration and there is no strong bond between zonal and woreda administrations. In Southern Nation, 
Nationalities, and People’s Regional State, therefore, the administration is hierarchically extended and needs 
more administrative tasks in public responsibilities than Afar Regional State.  
3.1. Components of Subnational Expenditures at Subnational Level 
At subnational governments’ level, particularly at woreda level, local governments are entitled to perform social, 
economic, and administrative responsibilities. The responsibilities of social sectors are basically associated with 
duties such as education, health, women and children sectors, civil service, sport, rural roads and transportation, 
and culture and tourism related activities. Responsibilities of economic sectors are also associated with 
agricultural, revenue and finance, municipalities, and cooperatives and marketing sectors. The above tasks are 
basic responsibilities that have to be managed by the lowest level of government (woreda). These tasks are 
uniformly applied in all woredas of the region to maintain uniformity in the region and to control the overall 
public services and political directions of the region as well as the country. However, this lacks the specific 
needs of citizens of particular woredas and community since their taste of public service in various localities 
differs in accordance with their social and economic needs.  
The need for expenditure responsibilities is attached with the available resources allocated to the governments at 
the local level, the commitment of the governments to accomplish the required level of services and technical 
and educational capacity to make decisions on these responsibilities. At local levels, governments’ expenditures 
are not coordinated and synchronized among adjacent local governments to ensure resource efficiency through 
spillover effects of public expenditures, especially capital investments. Woredas incur costs for similar 
investments that could have been coordinated by two adjacent local governments resulting in weak coordination 
of public expenditures and inefficiencies in public resource utilization.   
At regional level, the strategic direction of the government takes a considerable share in local governments’ plan 
and budget execution, and sectors need to strictly follow these strategic directions in their expenditure 
responsibilities. Although various tasks of the government are accomplished by local governments, most 
expenditure priorities are in the hands of the region.  This restricts their decisions on their specific needs and 
limits the flexibility of altering their priorities within their territory. This can be seen from two perspectives. On 
the one hand, leaving these areas to the local governments has some adverse impacts such as inefficiencies and 
wrong prioritization of needs as a result of knowledge gap and technical and professional requirements. 
Uncontrolled expenditures would result in inefficiencies and the policy directions may be ignored. On the other 
hand, restricted categories of expenditures limit the discretion of local governments and affect their allocative 
responsibilities in achieving local needs and preferences.  
Woredas are mostly focusing on expenditures that have little value for economic growth and development. In 
other words, expenditures at local levels have little impact on economic growth and development. Most capital 
projects are implemented and managed by the regional government. This happens to make control over 
unnecessary spending and mitigate wrong decisions in acquisition of long-term investment. However, restricting 
decisions at lower levels hampers the real local preferences that the citizens at local level demand.  
3.2. Local Revenue and Their Productivity 
Regional governments in Ethiopia, highly depend on the central government’s transfer (i.e., the share of federal 
grant is about 80%- 95% of the total budget), which means their revenue from their internal sources covers only 
20% to 5% of their total expenditures. The large portion of their revenue is from the block grant of the federal 
government. Although the central government is the main source of the local governments’ revenue, expenditure 
decisions are made at regional government levels with little control over the expenditures from the center. 
Practice shows that local spending has less control and at the center it is very common to be as a report reader.  
Revenues at local levels of government are not productive as trends of local shares on total budget of the region 
indicate. The table and figure shown below indicate that the total revenue of the region and the block grant of the 
federal government increase with very slight increase of revenues from own sources. On the other hand, non-tax 
revenues and revenues from other sources are almost nil and have the lowest contribution in the aggregate 
subnational government revenue of the region.  
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.11, 2014 
 
139 
Table 3.1: Share of Revenue from Total Budget of SNNPRS (000) 
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2003/04 1,283,714.44 1,042,818.000 175,540.3007 65,348.0035 8.13 81.23 13.67 5.09 0.00 100  
2004/05 1,414,419.25 1,129,008.229 206,521.9824 78,445.0873 443.95 79.82 14.6 5.54 0.031 100  
2005/06 1,707,694.56 1,438,060.000 200,289.7202 68,760.9364 583.90 84.21 11.72 4.02 0.03 100  
2006/07 2,222,339.38 1,875,021.07 278,212.5131 60,515.8418 8,589.96 84.37 12.51 2.72 0.4 100  
2007/08 3,170,979.05 2,672,454.359 406,223.8126 91,940.4421 360.44 84.27 12.81 2.89 0.01 100  
2008/09 3,997,736.21 3,341,735.188 523,650.6828 131,676.7592 673.58 83.59 13.09 3.29 0.02 100  
2009/10 4,872,331.10 3,989,448.488 627,107.4211 169,666.2122 86,108.12 81.88 12.87 3.48 1.77 100  
2010/11 6,521,923.92 5,166,313.004 924,034.9774 245,218.0513 186,357.89 79.21 14.16 3.75 2.86 100  
2011/12 10,390,476.33 8,412,958.663 1,407,386.063 326,710.4691 243,421.13 80.96 13.54 3.14 2.34 100  
2012/13 13,566,054.98 10,677,192.78 2,196,402.121 406,497.0622 285,963.02 78.70 16.19 2.99 2.11 100  
Source: Compiled from ten years financial reports of the Region, 2014  
The trend of shares of revenues in the past ten years of the region can be shown in the following way. 
 
Figure 3.1: Share of Revenue of SNNPRS (000) 
 
Source: Financial Data of the SNNPRS, 2014 
Figure 3.2: Federal Government Share on Total Budget of the Region (000) 
 
Source: Compiled from ten years financial reports of the Region, 2014  
The constitution of the government clearly distinguishes the revenue sources of the federal government and the 
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regional governments. The central government’s revenue sources are major revenue sources characterized by 
contributing a large share on aggregate government budget of the country. Article 96 of the Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia explains the power of the federal government to levy and collect taxes 
on imports and exports, employees of the federal government and international organizations, profits, income, 
sales and excise taxes on enterprises owned by the federal government, national lotteries,  transportation services 
such as air, rail, and sea transportation, income on properties and houses owned by the federal government, 
licenses issued and services rendered by the federal government, monopolies, and federal stamp duties.  
The above revenue sources are the major revenue sources and have the largest contribution in the government 
budget of the country. For example, more than twenty-nine (29) percent of the total national tax revenue is raised 
from customs duty, which is owned by the federal government. Moreover, the federal government’s share of 
revenue on VAT is about three-quarters (70%) of the total VAT collected at the regional level.  
On the other hand, the Constitution allows regional governments to levy and collect taxes on employees of the 
state and private enterprises, land usufractuary rights, farmers incorporated in cooperative associations, incomes 
of individual businesses within their territory, water transportation on their territory, private houses and other 
properties, income, profit, sales, personal and excise taxes of enterprises owned by the states, small-scale mining 
and royalties, licenses issued and services rendered by the states, and royalties on use of forests.  
Despite these revenue sources which are assigned to the local governments, the amount of revenue being raised 
from these sources is very insignificant and forces the central government to bear a large share of the regional 
government’s expenditures. The above table and figure indicate that local governments are highly dependent on 
the federal government’s transfer as a result of either (both) the non-productivity of their own revenue sources or 
(and) the commitment problem of lower level governments due to the convenience of federal block grant in 
avoiding costs and energy of  collection from own sources.  
Furthermore, the trend of the regional government indicates that the actual collection exceeds the planned one in 
many instances. The following table indicates the budgeted revenue and actual collection from domestic sources 
of the region.  
Table 3.2: Actual vs Budgeted Revenue of SNNPRS (000) 
Budget Year 
Budgeted vs Actual Revenue of SNNPRS (000) 
Budgeted Revenue Actual Revenue Variance 
2003/04 1,258,968.024 1,283,714.435 -24,746.411 
2004/05 1,445,204.332 1,414,419.251 30,785.081 
2005/06 1,696,150.000 1,707,694.559 -11,544.559 
2006/07 2,125,058.329 2,222,339.382 -97,281.053 
2007/08 3,012,664.359 3,170,979.050 -158,314.691 
2008/09 74,540.689 3,997,736.212 -3,923,195.523 
2009/10 22,300.00 4,872,331.104 -4,850,031.104 
2010/11 355,663.0837 6,521,923.919 -6,166,260.835 
2011/12 64,605.5907 10,390,476.330 -10,325,870.740 
2012/13 2,272,370.912 13,566,054.980 -11,293,684.070 
 Source: Computed from Financial (IBEX) Report of SNNPRS, 2014 
The revenue trend shows that the regional government (state) underestimates the amount of revenue that could 
be raised from its own tax bases. This may be the indication of the level of local governments’ commitment in 
raising revenues as close as the potential allows. This presses for a large amount of block grant from the federal 
government. In principle, the estimate of revenue takes place on the basis of past achievement and the change in 
economic conditions such as increase in trade licenses and registered businesses within their territory. However, 
the actual trend shows that regions rarely focus on the past trends to plan for future collections and a large 
variance indicates that the local government’s plan is not exhaustive and based on economic changes. On the 
other hand, the incentive effect of the federal grant might have created a compromise on local revenue sources. 
As it has been underscored many times previously, local governments are highly dependent on the federal grant 
and their share on economic resources is five to twenty percent according to the financial report of the regional 
states. The following two figures indicate how the actual collection deviates from the budgeted amount revenues 
in the region.  
The above bar diagram can be shown graphically in the following way.  
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Figure 3.3: Graphical Representation of Variance between Actual and Budgeted Revenue 
 
Source: Compiled from Financial Report of SNNPRS, 2014 
In the structure where insufficient revenue sources are assigned, the major source of revenue comes from the 
center and it alters local governments’ ability to raise revenues from their own sources and impairs 
accountability by loosening the connection between revenue sources and public services. As said earlier, at 
regional level the dependence of revenue on the central government is very significant (i.e., 80-95%), which 
indicates almost all the local government’s expenditures are covered by the federal grant and the role of local 
governments on raising revenue from their own sources is very minimal. This in turn, creates difficulty of 
tailoring revenue sources with public services, impairs the enthusiasm of local governments to raise revenues as 
their revenue potential allows, and reduces the efficiency, accountability, and responsibility in local jurisdictions.  
The constitution of Ethiopia states the revenue sources that are shared between the federal government and the 
regional governments. The shared revenue sources or tax bases are stated in Article 98 of the Constitution of the 
country. The federal government and the region jointly levy and collect tax revenues from these sources in 
principle. The indicated concurrent tax bases are tax revenues from profit, sales, excise and personal income 
taxes on enterprises the federal government and the regional government jointly establish; profits of companies 
and dividends due to shareholders from these companies; and large-scale mining and petroleum and gas 
operations, and royalties on these operations.  
The above concurrent tax bases are constitutionally designated as jointly owned revenue sources of the region. 
However, the implementation and administration of these revenue sources have become the main challenges as a 
whole. Firstly, the government has been privatizing many publicly owned enterprises and holding its hands back 
from investing in public enterprises. The trend shows that there are not jointly owned public enterprises 
established in regional governments. The government also doesn’t have any plan to invest in profit making 
public enterprises, because in a market-led economy it is not a priority of a government. Thus, the credibility and 
importance of this article is not clear. Furthermore, the revenue collected from jointly owned tax bases is almost 
zero.  Currently the government is working on how to manage these bases and revising the policy directions to 
create a clear accountability and responsibility of administration and management.  
Moreover, jointly owned companies are avoiding payment of tax obligations due to a loophole created as a result 
of unclear and vague reporting responsibility either to the state/region or the federal government. At woreda or 
zonal level, there are no constitutionally assigned revenue sources although they are entitled and collect the 
revenues from their citizens in their constituency.  
 
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications  
Developing countries face difficulty in implementation of decentralized structure when compared to 
industrialized countries. Factors such as macroeconomic structure and policy flexibility, tax structures and 
administration, and capabilities of local decision-making autonomy coupled with devolution challenges of tasks 
and responsibility are the main challenges in developing countries.  
Decentralization requires striking the balance between the central control policy direction and local needs. Public 
responsibilities have to be coordinated to efficiently allocate scarce resources and to ensure effective distribution 
of public services allowing adjacent governments to work together in achieving public policy directions avoiding 
policy disintegration among governments at subnational level.  
Governments at subnational level need to exercise the autonomy in revenue and expenditure decisions and 
minimize unnecessary dependence on federal grants. The central government has to take responsibility in 
enforcing and supporting subnational governments to strengthen their effort in planning and collecting revenues 
as their economy allows them to generate. Moreover, the federal government needs to make a decisive analysis 
of the structure of revenue sources considering the distortive effects of these revenue sources. 
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Clearly distinguished responsibility on concurrent revenues would improve government’s revenue and avoid 
loopholes and tradeoffs in administration of these revenue sources.      
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